

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

Material on Guatemala and Nicaragua
provided SecState during week 20-27 Nov.
re his queries to

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Date

20 November 1984

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Nicaraguan Support of Guatemalan Insurgents

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[redacted]
[redacted] are the latest links in a long chain of Cuban and, to a lesser extent, Sandinista logistical and training support for the Guatemalan insurgency.

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-- Havana is reliably reported to be heavily involved in training the estimated 1,500 to 2,000 insurgent combatants and has for years attempted to forge a single organization from Guatemala's three major guerrilla groups.

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-- Managua facilitates the transfer of insurgent recruits to and from Cuba, and also provides training in Nicaragua.

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The Guatemalan View

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of Nicaragua. Guatemala probably will remain supportive of the broad objectives of US policy in the region, but with the extent of cooperation contingent on a quid pro quo system. In our judgment, only substantial US military aid--in the form of credits or outright grants--or the prospect of an impending insurgent victory in El Salvador are likely to move Guatemala toward more active support of US interests.

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The orientations of the regime's current policy architects--Chief of State Mejia and Foreign Minister Andrade--reflect broad national values.

- These values have been reinforced by the government's counterinsurgency success and conditioned by the nation's sense of international isolation.
- Mejia has delegated substantial authority to Andrade to design and implement his overall foreign policy goals of acquiring resources to combat domestic insurgents and increase the government's legitimacy abroad.

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Nevertheless, Andrade recognizes that political power rests with the military and that he serves at their behest.

-- Andrade also must compete with Mejia's military advisors, particularly Vice Chief of State General Lobos.

-- While sympathetic to the US position, Lobos also apparently expects some quid pro quo before committing Guatemala on such issues as Contadora. [REDACTED]

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Meanwhile, there is little internal pressure on Guatemalan leaders to stiffen their regional stand because the country's political focus at present is being drawn inward by the drafting of a new constitution and other electoral laws in anticipation of national elections next year. [REDACTED]

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Opposition Groups in Nicaragua

Insurgent Groups and Leaders

Nicaraguan Unity for Reconciliation (UNIR):

Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), Adolfo Calero.

Misura Revolutionary Front, Steadman Fagoth.

Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, Alfonso Robelo.

Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE):

Sandino Revolutionary Front (FRS), Eden Pastora

MISURASATA, Brooklyn Rivera

Cooperation Among Insurgent Groups

The FDN, Miskito Indian guerrillas of the Misura, and Alfonso Robelo's faction of ARDE joined in late August to form the umbrella organization called the Nicaraguan Unity for Reconciliation (UNIR). Each group retains its separate identity, and participates on a unified directorate and five joint commissions. The FDN has shared its financial resources with its smaller allies and the Misura is totally dependent on the FDN for logistical support.

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Eden Pastora refused to unify with the FDN, which led to a split in the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance last June. Nevertheless, contacts continue between the two guerrilla

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coalitions and there is some limited cooperation.

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Insurgent Strength

The FDN continues to pose a serious military threat to the regime, but it probably is incapable of overthrowing the Sandinistas within the next year. Overall, insurgent prospects are likely to decline because of the lack of a steady source of external aid and because the Sandinistas are substantially increasing their own military capabilities.

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The following figures reflect strength figures submitted by informants, except where noted:

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Inside Nicaragua</u>
FDN	13,000	11,100
Misura	900	500
ARDE/Robelo	300	100 (estimate)
FRS/Pastora	2,000 (estimate)	1,800 (estimate)
MISURASTA	1,000	1,000
<u>Total</u>	17,200	14,500

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Civil Opposition

Democratic Coordinating Board

Headed by Luis Rivas Leiva, the Board comprises the following parties, listed with their leaders:

- Democratic Conservative Party of Nicaragua (PCDN),
Mario Rappaccioli.
- Social Democratic Party (PSD), Luis Rivas Leiva
- Social Christian Party (PSC), Agustin Jarquin
- Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PCL),
Alfredo Reyes Duque Estrada

The election campaign had the effect of unifying opposition groups of the Democratic Coordinating Board, but now the coalition is split over participation in the government-sponsored national dialogue and other issues.

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Other Democratic Opposition Parties

- Independent Liberal Party (PLI), Virgilio Godoy
- Democratic Conservative Party (PCD), Enrique Sotelo
- Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC), Mauricio Diaz

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The Independent Liberals and the Conservatives are divided over whether they will participate in the newly elected assembly. The Sandinistas are likely to replace members who refuse to take their seats with members from the faction in each party which favors cooperation with the regime.

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27 November 1984

Responses to Questions on Nicaragua from Secretary Shultz**What have been Sandinista tactics toward the opposition since the election?**

The Sandinistas have attempted to give the appearance of flexibility by promoting "national dialogue" talks involving 33 political, economic, and religious organizations. The talks were ostensibly to provide the opposition parties with the opportunity to give their opinion on the new constitution and other matters, despite their absence from the newly elected Assembly. Nevertheless, the Sandinistas used the session on 12 November not to discuss democratization, but to obtain the signature of 20 of the organizations on a document condemning US aggression. [REDACTED]

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The opposition coalition believes that such a large forum indicates the regime's lack of seriousness, but the Social Christians and both independent labor federations have continued to participate. The Sandinistas indicated at the 19 November meeting that they would be willing to limit future talks to the political parties. Such a move may be intended as a gesture to encourage foreign participation at the 10 January inauguration, but we judge that serious negotiations are unlikely. [REDACTED]

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The Sandinistas have stepped up harassment of opposition figures by refusing to allow them to travel abroad. As an example, airport officials tore a page out of the passport of business leader Enrique Bolanos and later claimed that his documents were incomplete. Moreover, the government has ordered reimposition of censorship on broadcasts of Archbishop Obando y Bravo's sermons which had been lifted in September. [REDACTED]

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What are the attitudes and interests of opposition leader Cruz?

We believe that Arturo Cruz is upbeat in his mood. He was scheduled to travel to San Jose on Monday for a seminar in which FDN and ARDE insurgent leaders also planned to participate. He plans to travel to Europe in late December or early January, and may not return to Nicaragua until after that trip. [REDACTED]

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[redacted] several opposition leaders--including Cruz--were discussing going into exile as early as January and forming a new anti-Sandinista group with links to the insurgents. We believe, however, that Cruz and others will not carry through with such a plan unless convinced that all possibilities for a political opening have been closed. [redacted]

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An opposition source told the US Embassy that Cruz seeks to be named party leader of the Conservatives--the oldest and largest opposition party--rather than the new leader of the opposition umbrella group. Cruz may sense some dissatisfaction with his leadership because of his frequent absences from the country and his alleged "accommodationist" stance toward the regime. By leading the Conservatives, however, he could restore his power base in the party, and he may be in the best position to attract Conservative dissidents who broke off to form their own party last year. [redacted]

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Opposition figures reportedly were unhappy with Cruz for his statements which criticized US pressures and called on the US to give President Ortega a "period of grace." [redacted]

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[redacted] he was misquoted by Washington Post reporter Joanne Omang and that he did not mean to criticize the US. We believe that Cruz probably was worried that opposition breathing space was becoming ever more limited by Sandinista moves during the "invasion" scare. He probably is also concerned that opposition hardliners be disabused of the notion that Nicaragua will be "saved" by a US intervention. [redacted]

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Will those in the opposition who were elected to Assembly seats participate in the government?

The Democratic Conservative leader who favored withdrawal from the election campaign told the Embassy that he will not take his Assembly seat, and he expects most of the 14 party deputies to follow suit. Independent Liberal Leader Virgilio Godoy reportedly said that he would not participate either, but party dissidents occupy most of the Liberals' seats. The third democratic party outside the opposition coalition--the Popular Social Christians--not only is likely to take its six Assembly seats, but probably would accept a cabinet post if it were offered. [redacted]

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Will Miskito Indian insurgents negotiate with the Sandinistas?

MISURASATA insurgent leader Brooklyn Rivera's recent trip to Managua reportedly has been opposed by Indian leaders of the northern-based Misura insurgents, as well as by some of his own troop commanders. His alliance partner, Eden Pastora, may not have opposed the trip, but probably opposes accommodation. We believe that Rivera is motivated by the critical supply situation of his troops and by his desire to be the preeminent Miskito leader. It is possible that he will negotiate a deal with the Sandinistas, but the majority of his own men probably would then join other insurgent groups. [REDACTED]

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Rivera's initiative was to have been discussed this week at a meeting in Honduras of both Miskito insurgent groups, but Honduran officials denied him entry into the country because they feared his supporters would turn the meeting into a pro-Sandinista forum. [REDACTED]

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